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Abstract 
Conflicts affect the social and economic conditions that could account for the stall in fertility decline 
in sub-Saharan Africa. In Rwanda the total fertility rate decreased very rapidly to 6.1 in the eighties 
but stalled at that level in the nineties. Part of the stall can be attributed to a lack of fertility con-
trol, but the question is whether social upheaval also affects fertility preferences. We identify three 
mechanisms through which the Rwanda conflict has led to a preference for larger families: mortality 
experience, modernization, the attitudes of third parties.
Using data from DHS, we tested the contribution of these mechanisms to the preference for small, 
medium or large families. With the exception of sibling mortality, there is a strong impact by these 
mechanisms on the preference for large families, yet they do not fully account for the shifts in pref-
erences over the years.
Résumé
Les conflits exercent un impact sur les facteurs socio-économiques qui à leur tour pourraient expli-
quer le ralentissement de la baisse de la fécondité en Afrique sub-saharienne. Le Rwanda, où le taux 
de fécondité a diminué très rapidement à 6.1 des années quatre-vingt, mais a stagné à ce niveau 
dans les années quatre-vingt-dix. Une partie de cette stagnation peut être attribuée à un manque 
de maîtrise de la fécondité, mais la question est de savoir si la guerre et le génocide au Rwanda ont 
affecté également les préférences de fécondité. Nous avons identifié trois mécanismes par lesquels 
les conflits peuvent conduire à une préférence pour les familles nombreuses: l'expérience de la mor-
talité, la modernisation, l'attitude des tiers.
Utilisant les données des EDS, nous avons testé la contribution de ces mécanismes à la préférence 
de la taille de la famille. À l'exception de la mortalité frères et sœurs, il y a un fort impact de ces 
mécanismes sur la préférence pour les familles larges, mais elles ne tiennent pas pleinement 
compte des changements dans les préférences au fil des années.
The second phase of the demographic transition 
(DT) is the period in which fertility declines rap-
idly and ends when the total fertility rate 
reaches replacement level. Most countries in 
the world have gone through this phase and 
many, like China, actually have below replace-
ment fertility. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only 
continent where the DT develops differently. In 
eight countries the fertility decline stalled at the 
early phase of the transition in the nineties of 
the previous century (Shapiro & Gebreselassie 
2008). Various explanations have been put for-
ward for this phenomenon: high levels of infant 
and child mortality, economic stagnation, deteri-
oration of reproductive health services, and lack 
of educational expansion (Bongaarts 2007, 
Schoumaker 2009). Some literature points to 
the effects of severe disruptive events like natu-
ral disasters and civil wars on these social and 
economic conditions that may account for the 
stall in fertility decline. For Rwanda this 
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approach seems to be appropriate. The total 
fertility rate decreased very rapidly in the eight-
ies (from 8.5 in 1983 to 6.2 in 1992) but stalled 
at that level in the nineties (6.1 in 2005). Recent 
data show that the demographic transition 
might have resumed its course recently (5.5 in 
2008 and 4.6 in 2010). 
In a previous paper we described how this 
stall in fertility decline coincided with changes in 
mortality experience, marriage patterns and dis-
continuation of family planning programs during 
the disruptive events in the early nineties (civil 
war, genocide, massive population movements). 
It is clear that the high fertility is at least partly 
due to a lack of fertility control. The actual use 
of modern contraceptive devices decreased 
after 1992 and the levels of unmet needs for 
reproductive health services increased. It is less 
clear to what extent higher fertility preferences 
play a role as well. The aim of this contribution 
is to isolate the role of fertility preferences by 
analyzing the shifts in desired family size in the 
period 1992-2008. We will indentify various 
mechanisms that could account for the change 
in the preference for small, medium and large 
family sizes in Rwanda. 
Desired family size or ideal number of children 
can be used an as important indicator of fertility 
preferences (De Silva 1991; Bankole and West-
off 1998). The more often cited determinants of 
desired family size are grouped into demo-
graphic factors such as age at marriage, mortal-
ity experience or gender preference, as well as 
socio-economic factors like level of education, 
current or childhood place of residence. This 
paper will take up these issues by grouping them 
in three main mechanisms: mortality experi-
ence, modernization process and the attitudes 
or influence of third parties. 
With the genocide in which 800 000 people lost 
their lives, the decreasing level of mortality at 
the end of the 1980s in Rwanda increased in the 
1990s and remained persistently high during the 
last years of the decade. (RDHS,2000; Housing 
and Population Census, 2002). Rathavuth (2009) 
describes the trends of neonatal, infant and 
under-five mortality to show how the mortality 
was high between 1995 and 2000. 
A reconstruction of mortality levels by 
Garenne and Gakusi (2005) displays mortality 
increase since the beginning of the civil war, 
with a peak in 1994 due to genocide and a rise 
again in 1998 probably to the hardship of life 
due to return migration. Although the mortality 
reached all the strata of the population, Schin-
dler and Brück (2011) relate the death of sib-
lings, considered as a strong indicator of 
exposure to the genocide, with fertility, but only 
in the short term. 
The early contributions on the decline in 
mortality and fertility from Frank Notestein 
(1953) saw societal modernization as the domi-
nant cause. However, as early as 1963 Kingsley 
Davis stated the improved survival to be the cen-
tral cause. An abundance of empirical evidence 
on the relationship between mortality and fertil-
ity has been gathered since. LeGrand et al. 
(2003) distinguish three pathways by which 
women or couples are going from child mortal-
ity to fertility: physiological, replacement and 
insurance (or holding) mechanisms. The first 
two mechanisms deal with individual (conscious 
or not) response by the woman who has lost 
her child. The proper way to study that is to 
consider the birth intervals and the desire to 
have an additional child. The concern in this 
paper is the third mechanism which is more 
focused on people’s perceptions and under-
standings and on reconciling the desired number 
of children with their risks of dying. 
In other words, the insurance hypothesis 
implies that the fear of losing children influences 
the ideal number of births. In countries like 
Rwanda this hypothesis can be extended to the 
loss of siblings, because this loss could contrib-
ute to the perception of the risk of losing one’s 
own children. Siblings, just like adult children, 
are an important part of the social support sys-
tem in hard times. The high prevalence of 
deaths in the period 1992-1995 might account 
for the peak in fertility preferences in the years 
after this period.
Without going into detailed arguments on the 
modernization theory our analysis refers to the 
modernisation mechanism in two ways. The 
Theoretical  background  and 
hypotheses
The mortality experience mechanism
The modernisation mechanism
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first is to relate it with the role of women’s edu-
cation. The relation between women’s educa-
tion and the family size has been analyzed in 
various ways. These include the direct and indi-
rect effect of women’s education on actual fam-
ily size (Janowitz, 1976; McCarthy and Oni, 
1987; Jejeebhoy, 1995), the interrelation 
between woman’s education, child survival and 
family size desires (Jejeebhoy, 1995) and the 
expected longer duration of education for the 
children that reduces the number women want 
(McCarthy and Oni, 1987). There is some evi-
dence that the real change in women’s prefer-
ences occurs among those who reached 
secondary or higher levels of education (Uche 
and Isugo, 1994).
Furthermore, this relationship changes over 
time and depends on contextual factors being 
stronger or remaining the same in countries at 
early stages of fertility transition rather than 
being reduced, except for the more developed 
countries, characterized by a consistent fertility 
decline (Jejeebhoy, 1995). 
Based on this evidence from the literature, 
women’s level of education will be included in 
our analyses in order to investigate how the fer-
tility preferences can change with or remain 
constant without further educational expan-
sion. 
Women’s occupations as well as a husband’s 
or partner’s occupation could be used as proxy 
of socio-economic factors related to the ideal 
number of children. For women the occupation 
does not only constitute an indicator of house-
hold wealth, but also illustrates her autonomy in 
decision making. The type of occupation could 
also lead to a different valuation of children as 
either a cost or a benefit in terms of an extra 
hand on the farm. 
The education and occupation of the hus-
band would add to the wealth effects and 
together they are expected to lead to a desire 
for smaller families, because an increase in 
wealth shifts the quantity/quality trade-off of 
children, and because more educated couples 
will easily discuss family planning and will be 
open to the use of contraceptive methods 
(Cochrane 1990, Ezeh et al. 1993). 
The second factor related to the moderniza-
tion mechanism is urbanization which links the 
childhood and current place of residence. It has 
been documented that women living in rural 
areas have distinctly higher fertility preferences 
than urban women, even after accounting for 
the difference in occupation and educational 
level (Knodel et al. 1996). The additional impact 
of place of residence on fertility intentions could 
be due to socio-cultural factors linked to mod-
ernization and to different urban and rural 
labour market conditions. 
This raises the question whether migrants 
from the countryside bring to the city more tra-
ditional values on fertility or assimilate more 
modern views either before or after the move 
to the city. This is known as the adaptation 
hypothesis which relies on the idea that fertility 
behaviour of migrants will change from child-
hood dominant behaviour to resemble the fertil-
ity preferences dominant at the destination 
(Kulu, 2005). For rapidly urbanizing countries 
like Rwanda this is an important issue, and we 
will categorize women according to their place 
of residence at the moment of interview and to 
where they spent the childhood in our models.
The attitudes of the husband or partner as well 
as other community members, like parents or 
mothers in law, are the third mechanism that 
may account for the change in fertility prefer-
ences in developing countries. Third parties 
might have an effect on the reported fertility 
preferences of women as they are affected by 
the society, which is a patriarchy in most of the 
cases in sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore 
unlikely that the fertility preference could be 
explained by individual characteristics only, even 
for educated and employed women as the role 
of the male is still preponderant (Woldemicael, 
2007). The complication of including in research 
and reproductive health programs direct meas-
urements of women’s autonomy has encour-
aged scholars to expand their analysis on other 
variables like religion, access to media and part-
ner’s individual characteristics such as approval 
of family planning or even discussion about it. As 
it is a multi-dimensional concept it has been 
defined in relation with men or other women in 
terms of culture, religious beliefs, traditions and 
economic environments and sometimes as 
women’s status. Therefore the concept is diffi-
cult to capture with a single measurement (Goni 
and Saito, 2009). In this paper, we expect the 
Attitudes of third parties
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attitudinal variables related to third parties, such 
as approval of family planning or its discussion 
among partners, to be a way of regulating the 
future fertility by reducing the fertility prefer-
ences. Joint decision making may bring women 
closer to expected results than individual char-
acteristics. 
The ideal number of children could also be 
related to the age of women as their reproduc-
tive capacity declines dramatically after the 
fourth decade of life. One could consider a posi-
tive relationship between the desire for larger 
families and age in two ways. The first mecha-
nism could be that young women cope better 
with the modern reproductive means than their 
older sisters who may replicate more traditional 
reproductive norms. The second is the rationali-
sation of the actual number of children into a 
preferred number.
Based on the fact that in Rwanda almost all 
the births occur in marriage, we expect the fer-
tility preference to be higher for married 
women than those formerly married or those 
who declare themselves to be single. 
There is evidence in the literature that mar-
riage formation slows down in a period of crisis 
and recovers directly after the disrupting event 
(Nobles & Buttenheim, 2006). Assuming con-
scious fertility control within marriage, women 
or couples will delay births voluntarily and those 
who are not married will delay the formation of 
a stable partnership and will favour smaller fam-
ily as a consequence of economic hardships (Pal-
loni et al. 1996; Lindstrom et al. 1999). 
The central hypothesis of this paper is that 
the increase in desired family size in Rwanda in 
the aftermath of the 1994 genocide can be 
attributed at least in part to a rise in mortality 
experience, both of children and siblings, but is 
also supported by the slowing down of the 
urbanization process and the fact that educa-
tional expansion came to a halt. However, these 
mechanisms may not fully account for the 
change in fertility preferences over the years. 
There might be an extra effect of the disrupting 
event itself on the mindset of women involved 
either through third party effects which favour 
more pro-natalist attitudes or because the loss 
of family through war brings about extra uncer-
tainty in deciding on the ideal number of chil-
dren. 
In his classical contribution Pullum (1983) 
described some characteristics to be considered 
when analyzing the desired family size in less 
developed countries. In the latter the ideal 
number of children can be illustrated a projected 
ideal (e.g. for one’s daughter), as a personal ideal
(what is best for one’s family) or as a generalized 
ideal (what is best for the community or coun-
try). Even if it is measured as a personal ideal, 
more general considerations might come into 
play. The desired size will be more indicative of 
the mindset than a prediction of the actual fertil-
ity over the life course. 
Depending on the level of autonomy of the 
woman in the country of survey, third parties 
might influences the response consciously (if 
present at the interview) or subconsciously, and 
the declared number would basically indicate 
the one with a relative convenience for the 
respondent.
 As we are not using the desired family size 
as a predictor of future actual fertility, but are 
interested in whether personal and collective 
experience affects the mind-set when it comes 
to fertility preferences, these issues do not ham-
per our analyses but will be taken into account 
in defining the models and used in the interpre-
tation of the results. 
In this paper, we use the Rwanda Demo-
graphic Health Surveys (RDHS) of 1992, 2000, 
2005 and the interim RDHS of 2008. The use of 
the latter instead of the 2010 RDHS was based 
on the different formulation of the variable on 
the urbanisation. In the four previous datasets 
this variable has three categories (Kigali, Small 
cities and Countryside) whereas in 2010 the 
variable been replaced by a categorisation of 
region (Kigali, South, West, North and East) 
instead of urbanisation. In addition to data on 
the birth histories of women, background char-
acteristics of women aged 15 to 49 years old 
and their husband if any were collected at the 
moment of the survey.
The dependent variable used in this study is 
a question in the RDHS designed to measure the 
fertility preferences using the ideal number of 
children as stated by both women having chil-
Data description and methods
Some control variables
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dren or not. The question in the RDHS is 
phrased as: “If you could go back to the time 
when you did not have any children and could 
choose exactly the number of children to have 
in your whole life, how many would that be? Or 
if you could have exactly the number of children 
you want, what would that be?” This variable 
has responses from zero children to twenty and 
more and one category of non-numeric 
responses. Women who stated that their ideal 
number of children is twenty or more as well as 
those who expressed it as a non-numerical 
answer (e.g. “it is God’s will”), are taken 
together with women who declared a very high 
number of desired offspring. 
There are two reasons to doubt that the 
dependent variable is of ratio level. The first 
reason is that the intervals between the num-
bers listed are not proportional. In a context 
where practically no one wants less than three 
children, one might wonder about the differ-
ence between one, two and three. At the other 
end of the distribution the difference between 
seven, eight, nine, or more might not be a delib-
erate choice, but triggered by the need to give a 
finite number. The second reason is the relative 
utility of any given number. One more or one 
less could be acceptable. We solved this by 
treating the ideal number of children as an ordi-
nal variable, taking Zero-Three children as one 
category, Four and Five as separate categories 
and Six and over as a measure of wanting many 
children. 
The explanatory factors as stated in the the-
oretical background are grouped into mortality 
experience, modernization process, and atti-
tudes of third parties. The first independent var-
iables are mortality of offspring and siblings’ 
mortality, which are grouped into three catego-
ries each: no mortality experience, the respond-
ent experienced one or two losses, and those 
who experienced the death of three or more. 
The mortality of offspring is related to all chil-
dren who died as stated by the respondents, 
whereas the death of siblings is associated with 
brothers and sisters of respondents who died in 
the period of the genocide (1993, 1994 and 
1995). The second group of explanatory varia-
bles are education and urbanisation. Women’s 
highest level of education is categorized as non- 
educated, incomplete primary, completed pri-
mary, incomplete secondary, secondary or plus. 
The migration history combines the actual place 
of residence with the childhood place of resi-
dence and is used to measure the extent to 
which the place where one’s lives has impact on 
the fertility preference in terms of individual or 
collective choices. The third group is the 
approval of family planning by the partner and 
the discussion of family planning by the couple. 
In addition age or marital status are included as 
control variables. Women selected for the pur-
pose of this study are aged from 20 years to 49 
years old. 
We used ordinal logistic regression to model 
the woman’s ideal number of children because 
of the ordinal nature of the outcome variable, 
but also because it offers interesting analytic 
options such as going beyond simple significance 
testing, summarizing the association of interest 
of all levels of outcome and assessing confound-
ing and interaction effects for all independent 
variables (Scott et al. 1997).
The ordinal logistic regression, often 
referred to as the proportional odds model 
(Norris et al. 2006), or cumulative logit, is an 
extension of the binary logistic regression and an 
appropriate method of analysis for grouped 
continuous response variable (Lall, R. et al. 
2002). This ordinal model consists of n-1 logit 
equations, assuming the odds of each equation 
to be proportional, also known as the parallel 
lines assumption. Its functional form is:
Where j ranges from 1 to the number of catego-
ries minus one
And (j) = probability (score j) / (1- probability 
(score j))
The j’s is referred to as a threshold or intercept. 
Each category of the independent variables 
except the highest (here: reference category) 
has its own threshold. In our analysis, 1 = the 
Ln θj( ) αj βiXi–=
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log-odd of wanting three or less children, 2 = 
the log-odd of wanting four or less and 3 = the 
log-odd of wanting five or less. The rest want six 
or more children.
A positive parameter is subtracted from this 
threshold, indicating lower chances of wanting 
few children and higher chances of wanting 
more. The higher the parameter the more chil-
dren women desire. As the model is propor-
tional each logit has the same coefficient. 
Allison (1999) concluded that this approach 
may be invalid and even misleading when com-
paring groups, as the dispersion in the response 
probabilities could not be uniform across 
groups, violating the assumption of parallel lines. 
The risks of violating this assumption are 
reduced if the model is well specified and 
includes interaction effects to account for heter-
ogeneity within groups (Williams 2009), but 
there is no guarantee that it captures unequal 
dispersion. 
Therefore we use the heterogeneous choice 
models, also known as location-scale models. 
The location model gives the shift in the 
response probability to either right or left, while 
the scale model explicitly models the dispersion 
in the response probabilities (Jansen M. et al. 
2009). This model offers, in addition to the shifts 
in the ideal number of children, more clarity 
about the heterogeneity within certain specified 
groups. The model is extended and redefined as 
follows: 
With y being a vector of parameter estimates 
referring to the scale model (Jansen M. et al. 
2009). This shows that when y=0 the location-
scale model is reduced to the cumulative logit 
model. The higher y, the larger is the dispersion 
for the groups defined by the explanatory varia-
bles and when it is lower than zero this means 
the groups defined by the explanatory variables 
are more homogeneous in terms of ideal 
number of children. 
Four data sets (1992, 2000, 2005 and 2008) of 
women aged from 20 to 49 years old have been 
used for the analysis (Table 1). Unfortunately no 
data were collected in 1996, which would have 
given information directly after the disruptive of 
the 1994 genocide. Collecting data was clearly 
not the first priority in the years after the trau-
matic event.

















0 - 3 4 5 6 & more













Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for each year of interview. We expected to observe 
Results
African Population Studies 27, No 2, October 2013
http://aps.journals.ac.za 111
  
Table1 Descriptive statistics by year of interview
Variables 1992 2000 2005 2008
Ideal number of children
0 - 3 26.7% 17.5% 23.1% 54.2%
4 40.8% 35.7% 41.8% 31.8%
5 15.6% 17.7% 15.3% 6.1%
6+ 16.9% 29.1% 19.8% 7.9%
Mortality experience (Children)
0 61.5% 59.8% 63.2% 71.8%
1 19.6% 20.7% 19.5% 16.3%
2 9.6% 10.0% 9.3% 6.9%
3 4.8% 5.2% 4.3% 3.0%
4+ 4.5% 4.3% 3.7% 2.1%
Level of education
No education 40.4% 32.2% 27.3% 23.9%
Inc. primary 42.2% 36.0% 49.5% 45.0%
Primary 6.7% 17.8% 11.6% 18.1%
Inc. secondary 8.9% 10.0% 7.7% 7.2%
Secondary 1.3% 3.1% 2.9% 4.1%
Higher 0.5% 0.9% 1.0% 1.7%
Type of place of residence
Countryside 82.5% 75.9% 77.4% 74.1%
Small cities 6.4% 10.2% 13.2% 15.5%
Kigali 11.1% 13.9% 9.4% 10.4%
Marital status
Never married 16.5% 15.7% 20.7% 22.1%
Currently married 70.5% 61.4% 61.8% 63.4%
Formerly married 13.0% 22.8% 17.5% 14.5%
Age
20 – 29 46.2% 45.9% 47.0% 49.8%
30 – 39 34.6% 31.5% 29.7% 28.8%
40 – 49 19.2% 22.6% 23.3% 21.4%
Siblings mortality
None - 23.5% 20.2 -
One or more - 76.5% 79.8 -
Migration status
Countryside ‹ Countryside - 74.8% 76.0% -
Countryside ‹ Small City - 0.6% 0.5% -
Countryside ‹ Kigali - 0.3% 0.4% -
Small City ‹ Countryside - 6.4% 9.6% -
Small City ‹ Small City - 3.4% 3.3% -
Small City ‹ Kigali - 0.3% 0.3% -
Kigali ‹ Countryside - 8.9% 6.1% -
Kigali ‹ Small City - 1.9% 1.2% -
Kigali ‹ Kigali - 3.1% 2.0% -
Husband approves FP
Disapprove - 18.3% 15.8% -
Approve - 54.0% 62.4% -
Don’t know - 27.7% 21.8% -
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Graph 1 shows the shifts in family preferences 
between the years in the form of cumulative 
percentages of the desired number of children. 
In 1992 close to 30% wanted no more than 3 
children, 70% regarded four or less as the ideal 
and 85 wanted less than six children. In 2000 the 
ideal number of children was much higher. Less 
than 20% wanted to stop at three and 50% 
indicated that they wanted more than 4 chil-
dren, and 30% even wanted 6 or more. In 2005 
the pattern illustrates that the fertility prefer-
ence of women is close to the one in 1992. The 
fertility preference in 2008 is radically different if 
compared to previous years. Of all women aged 
20-49 no less than 60% state that three children 
or less is the ideal number and 90% indicate a 
maximum of four. This huge shift raises some 
methodological doubt. The ‘sensitizing’ cam-
paign of the government of Rwanda after 2005, 
promoting three children as the ideal family size, 
might have led to socially desirable responses in 
the 2008 interim RDHS rather than an expres-
sion of a conscious change in the fertility behav-
iour of women. 
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for 
each year of interview. We expected to observe 
more women that had lost at least one child in 
the 2000 set, in particular compared to both 
1992 and 2008. We found that infant and child 
mortality rates were already very high in 1992 
and in 2000 and they deviated only marginally 
from the first Rwanda demographic and health 
survey. We find much higher numbers of for-
merly married (widowed or separated) women 
in 2000 and 2005 than in 1992 and in 2008. The 
data show that urbanization, which is expected 
to lead to a smaller number of ideal children 
over time, is on its way in Rwanda but only at a 
slow pace. The proportion of respondents in 
the rural neighbourhoods gradually decreases as 
people prefer to live in small cities or in the cap-
ital as those areas are relatively well equipped in 
terms of infrastructures and offer more socio-
economic opportunities. The proportion living 
in small cities increased gradually whereas in 
Kigali the increase is particularly important in 
2000. In general, the educational expansion 
seems to have increased steadily as the propor-
tion of non educated went from 40.4% in 1992 
to 24% in 2008. But a closer look at all types of 
level of education show that the main changes 
appear in 2000 where the proportions of 
women with primary and secondary level edu-
cation have more than doubled. This might be 
an effect of the return of large numbers of 
Rwandese living in exile in Burundi, Uganda and 
Congo before the regime change in 1994. 
Efforts to stimulate enrolment in primary educa-
tion have been a major priority of the new 
administration and could account for the rising 
levels of (completed) primary education after 
2000.  
Unfortunately we do not have data on the atti-
tudes on family planning for 1992 and 2008, but 
the data show the low level of approval in 2000. 
Only 54% of the women indicate that their hus-
bands approve family planning and more than 
40% has never discussed it. Five years later 
approval rates have gone up to 62% and 70% 
has discussed family planning at least once. 
The outcomes from the location-scale models in 
Table 2 and 3 come from two stepwise analyses. 
The first analysis (Table 2 and Model 3) is a gen-
eral model that tests the assumptions from 
Demographic Transition Theory. All mechanisms 
defined in that theory show up with the correct 
sign. The year of interview, the mortality experi-
ence (death of own children), the level of educa-
tion, the place of residence, the marital status 
and the respondent’s age are all related to the 
ideal number of children. The mortality experi-
ence, the age of respondent and place of resi-
dence (with Kigali as reference category) are 
clearly positively related to large family size 
preference. Women who experienced many 
deaths of their children are more likely to desire 
a large family than the one who lost fewer or did 
not lose any child. Women aged 30 and over are 
more likely to prefer a large family than their 
younger sisters, and living outside Kigali 
increases the likelihood of preferring a large 
number of children. 
Discussion about FP
Never - 42.1% 30.5% -
Once or twice - 23.2% 27.0% -
More often - 34.7% 42.5% -
Valid 5079 7694 8726 5879
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Lastly, taking into consideration the marital sta-
tus, the category of women “currently married” 
shows log odds ratios of 0.309 and the category 
of “formerly married” women is negatively devi-
ating (-0.190) from the reference category 
(“Never married”) in terms of ideal number of 
children. The culture and the policy in Rwanda 
are not in favour of extramarital births and 
remarriage for widowed or separated women. 
It is a phenomenon which is affected by a very 
low social acceptance. Formerly married 
women might therefore equate their ideal 
number to their actual number of children.
Model 6 differs from Model 3 in two aspects. 
The first is that 1992 and 2008 data-sets were 
excluded as information on mortality of siblings 
as well as family planning approval and its discus-
sion by the couple were not included. The sec-
ond is that Model 6 includes a variable that 
reflects the migration history combining the cur-
rent and the childhood place of residence and 
the year of interview and age of respondents 
Table 2 Risk factors of large family size preference (1992 – 2008)
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 Location Scale Location Scale Location Scale
Threshold [0 - 3] -0.800*** -0.423*** -0.265***
Threshold [4] 1.122*** 1.608*** 1.682***
Threshold [5] 1.988*** 2.517*** 2.549***
Year [1992] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
Year [2000] 0.702*** 0.053* 0.853*** 0.042 0.824*** 0.036
Year [2005] 0.223*** 0.035 0.251*** 0.039 0.254*** 0.041
Year [2008] -1.420*** 0.049 -1.499*** 0.142*** -1.430*** 0.140***
Child mortality [None] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
Child mortality [1-2] 0.288*** -0.018 0.139*** -0.002 0.100*** 0.007
Child mortality [3 +] 0.366*** 0.020 0.156*** 0.038 0.119** 0.066
Age [20 - 29] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
Age [30 - 39] 0.362*** 0.125*** 0.312*** 0.141*** 0.264*** 0.149***
Age [40 - 49] 0.356*** 0.101** 0.292*** 0.129*** 0.277*** 0.153***
[2000] * [20-29] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
[2000] * [30-39] -0.150* -0.040 -0.133 -0.018 -0.077 -0.023
[2000] * [40-49] 0.071 0.145** 0.041 0.161*** 0.120 0.149
[2005] * [20-29] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
[2005] * [30-39] -0.166** -0.118** -0.092 -0.102** -0.073 -0.117**
[2005] * [40-49] 0.007 0.011 0.062 -0.005 0.109 -0.028
[2008] * [20-29] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
[2008] * [30-39] 0.275*** -0.002 0.422*** -0.036 -0.073 -0.117**
[2008] * [40-49] 0.502*** 0.098 0.607*** 0.072 0.109 -0.028
[None + Inc. Primary] 0a 0a 0a 0a
[Primary] -0.292*** -0.067*** -0.282*** -0.065***
[Inc. Secondary] -0.693*** -0.106*** -0.659*** -0.109***
[Secondary +] -1.260*** 0.033 -1.213*** -0.029
Kigali 0a 0a
Small city 0.351*** 0.334***
Countryside 0.740*** 0.673***
Never married 0a 0a
Currently married 0.309*** -0.077***
Formerly married -0.190*** -0.040
Valid cases 27379 27379 27379
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have been combined into one variable.
The period 2000 and 2005 is close to the period 
of the genocide and could therefore give a bet-
ter image of the short-term impact of that dis-
ruptive event on fertility preference. Although 
the offspring mortality appears to be positively 
(0.254 to 0.328) related to family size prefer-
ences, this relationship progressively loses its 
significance when including variables related to 
modernisation progress and even becomes neg-
ative when attitudes of the partner enter the 
Table 3 Risk factors of large family size preference (2000 – 2005)
2000ñ2005 Parameter Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Location Scale Location Scale Location Scale
Threshold [0 - 3] -1.459*** -1.894*** -2.272***
Threshold [4] 0.332*** -0.050 -0.506***
Threshold [5] 1.134*** 0.778*** 0.315***
Year [2000] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
Year [2005] -0.442*** -0.012*** -0.551*** -0.008 -0.528*** 0.078**
Child mortality [None] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
Child mortality [1-2] 0.254*** -0.021 0.093*** -0.005 0.054
Child mortality [3 +] 0.328*** 0.015 0.100 0.026 -0.142**
Siblingsí mortality [None] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
[1-2] -0.143*** -0.071*** -0.095*** -0.058*** -0.096*** -0.049*
[3+] -0.345*** -0.061* -0.150*** -0.054 -0.123* 0.001
Age [20 - 29] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
Age [30 - 39] 0.212*** 0.091*** 0.179*** 0.120*** 0.286*** 0.202***
Age [40 - 49] 0.418*** 0.252*** 0.325*** 0.289*** 0.364*** 0.389***
[2005] * [20-29] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
[2005] * [30-39] -0.016 -0.085** 0.034 -0.075* 0.045 -0.186***
[2005] * [40-49] -0.054 -0.158*** 0.023 -0.164*** 0.075 -0.277***
[None + Inc. Primary] 0a 0a 0a 0a
[Primary] -0.296*** -0.082*** -0.300*** -0.055*
[Inc. Secondary +] -0.615*** -0.145*** -0.494*** -0.154***
[Secondary +] -1.197*** -0.098* -1.132*** 0.047
[Countryside - Countryside] 0a 0a 0a 0a
[Countryside -Small city] -0.093 0.164 -0.093 0.312*
[Countryside - Kigali] -0.375** -0.339** -0.479** -0.351**
[Small city - Countryside] -0.331*** -0.124*** -0.272*** -0.104**
[Small city - Small city] -0.444*** 0.000 -0.230* 0.138*
[Small city - Kigali] -0.658*** -0.137 -0.484** -0.193
[Kigali - Countryside] -0.711*** -0.080** -0.739*** -0.070
[Kigali - Small city] -0.474*** 0.017 -0.516*** 0.085
[Kigali - Kigali] -0.923*** -0.050 -0.774*** -0.001
Partner [Disapproves] 0a 0a
Partner [Approves] -0.353*** -0.194***
[Don't know] -0.086 -0.057
Discuss FP [Never] 0a 0a
Discuss FP [Once or twice] -0.054 0.006
Discuss FP [More often] -0.254*** -0.083**
Valid cases 16420 16352 9918
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model. 
We hypothesized that the loss of siblings 
would also lead to a higher desired number of 
children. The death of siblings shows a limited 
and negative significant relationship with the 
preference for a large family. This means that 
women who lost their siblings due to the civil 
war and the genocide do not particularly desire 
a high number of children. As expected there is 
a negative association between partners who 
approve or discuss family planning as well as the 
education level along with the ideal family size. 
Again as expected the age of respondents is 
positively related with the fertility preference, 
meaning that younger women are less likely to 
prefer large family sizes than their elder sisters. 
As in the previous model with the four data sets 
(Table 2) we that found that the women aged 
30-39 and 40-49 are not homogeneous in terms 
of the ideal number of children as the scale 
model shows clear positive and significant esti-
mates. Again, this could mean that these age 
groups consist both of people that have been 
witness to the genocide and of people that 
returned to the country afterwards. Unfortu-
nately the data does not allow a classification of 
people that left the country previously and 
returned after the period of atrocities, but we 
can reconstruct a variable showing whether 
people remained in the countryside, moved to a 
small city or to the capital Kigali, testing the 
hypothesis that urbanization corresponds to a 
desire for smaller families.
The migration history does have the 
expected effect. In particular people moving to 
Kigali from the countryside show lower num-
bers of desired children (-0.739), compared to 
those that stayed. The smaller cities are indeed 
somewhere in between, but people who moved 
to these places from Kigali clearly want fewer 
children (-0.484). Again, as expected, women 
who live in Kigali and did not move since their 
childhood have the lowest estimates of prefer-
ence for large family size (-0.774). 
Model 6 pertains to currently married 
women which enables the inclusion of the hus-
band approval of family planning and discussion 
with partner about the family planning. Even 
though Rwanda is not a very strict patriarchal 
society we did expect a substantial influence of 
the husband attitudes towards reproductive 
health on the desired number of children as 
reported by women. The parameters are in line 
with this hypothesis and indicate a significant 
effect (-0.353) if both approve of family planning 
and if partners discuss it as a couple (-0.254). 
Women who declared that they had a discussion 
about family planning with their partner only 
once or twice are not significantly different from 
those who had never discussed the matter.
Even after controlling for mortality experi-
ence and other risk factors, the year 2000 
stands out as the year in which ideal family size 
is higher. Although this might be the result of 
unobserved heterogeneity, it could mean that 
the mindset in general is more in favour of more 
children after a disruptive event.
The relevant fact is that preference for a large 
family size is very high in 2000 compared to all 
other years regardless of the level of mortality 
experience. The variable year of interview 
shows a very high increase in the preference for 
large families in the year 2000 and a very steady 
drop in the years after. The loss of explanatory 
power of the mortality experience after inclu-
sion of education and urbanisation variables indi-
cates that its role maybe different in exceptional 
circumstances. 
 As stated in the methodology section, the 
scale model offers the opportunity to address 
the issue of heterogeneity in the ideal number of 
children within groups of women. On the whole 
most scale effects are either not significant or 
small, with the exception of the parameters for 
the year 2008 and the higher age groups. As 
these parameters are positive it means that het-
erogeneous responses are more common in 
2008, indicating that here might be minority 
groups that still favour large families. The dis-
persion in the higher age groups might indicate 
unobserved heterogeneity between cohorts 
that might be linked to experience of the geno-
cide not captured by the actual loss of children. 
The scale parameter is in particular substantial 
for the highest age group in 2000.
This paper aims to contribute to the debate 
on the stalling fertility decline in sub-Saharan 
Africa, by analyzing the role of disruptive events 
in shaping the fertility preferences in Rwanda 
using the Rwanda DHS datasets from 1992 to 
2008. 
Discussions and conclusion
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We are not measuring ideal family size as a 
proximate determinant of actual fertility but as a 
general opinion as to how many children would 
be appropriate to women in Rwanda either pro-
spectively for young women or retrospectively 
for their elder sisters. This relative definition 
emphasizes the orientation of this study to 
whether the fertility preference may have been 
affected by the civil war and genocide in 
Rwanda. 
This paper captures three mechanisms 
through which disruptive events may account 
for the change in the fertility preference level. 
The first mechanism is the mortality experience, 
the direct consequence of major crises. The 
proxies used in this study to capture the mortal-
ity experience that is expected to lead to desire 
a large family were the mortality of offspring and 
the mortality of respondents’ siblings. The sec-
ond mechanism refers to common trends like 
further educational expansion and rapid urbani-
zation, which are known to lead to desires for 
smaller families and are generally interrupted as 
a result of major crises. The third mechanism 
expands our views to the attitudinal variables of 
third parties that may account for the change of 
fertility preferences after a disruptive event. 
These variables are a husband’s approval of fam-
ily planning and its discussion by the couple.
Using data from four consecutive Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys we were able to 
show for Rwanda over a period of sixteen years 
that infant and child mortality remained at a high 
level, with only slight improvements after 2005. 
Educational expansion slowed down in this 
period. Urbanization progressed at a relatively 
slow but steady pace during this period.
The multivariate analyses indeed corrobo-
rate the existing insights that these factors play a 
decisive role in the desired family size, and part 
of the stall in the fertility decline can therefore 
be related to the fact that the determinants of 
fertility preferences hardly changed over time. 
The expected influence of mortality experience 
on the fertility preference related to the insur-
ance hypothesis was not found to be as impor-
tant as the modernization process. The 
migration status stresses the facts that living or 
having lived in Kigali contributes a lot to a desire 
for smaller families; furthermore, the level of 
education has a strong effect on the desired 
family size. Young generations are less likely to 
prefer large families. The approval or the discus-
sion of family planning by the couple is also con-
tributing significantly to lower fertility 
preference. 
The scale model does show that the highest 
age groups in particular are heterogeneous in 
their fertility preferences in 2000. We specu-
lated that this might be linked to their country of 
residence during the genocide. Many people 
returned from exile after the end of the civil war 
and this might account for the heterogeneity 
within this group. Unfortunately the data do not 
allow us to bring this distinction into our mod-
els. Even after controlling for the factors that 
contribute to the explanation of the ideal family 
size, the year 2000 and to a lesser extent 2005 
stand out in having exceptional high levels of 
desired fertility. This provides some evidence 
that violent deaths change the overall mind-set 
of the population to more pro-natalist attitudes. 
A more in-depth analysis of the effects of chil-
dren’s mortality showed that these are indeed 
stronger in the aftermath of the genocide in 
Rwanda. However, we found no support for the 
idea that the loss of siblings also contributes to 
the explanation of wanting more children.
It is clearly seen that fertility decline may 
resume in the years to come. Further educa-
tional expansion and urbanization and decreas-
ing levels of infant and child mortality will 
certainly lower the desired number of children. 
Also the mind-set seems to have shifted, consid-
ering the huge shift in the reported ideal family 
size in 2008. This might be result of the ‘sensi-
tizing’ campaign by the Rwandan government, 
which could have led respondents in the ques-
tionnaire to include “what is good for the coun-
try” in their response to the question on the 
personal ideal with respect to the number of 
children. However, a decrease in ideal family 
size alone is not enough to bring down actual 
fertility. Access to reproductive services is a req-
uisite to arriving at the ideal family size. 
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